Walton v. Commonwealth
501 S.E.2d 134 (Va. 1998) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 27
Fall 9-1-1998
Walton v. Commonwealth 501 S.E.2d 134 (Va.
1998)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, Va. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walton v. Commonwealth 501 S.E.2d 134 (Va. 1998), 11 Cap. DEF J. 213 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol11/iss1/27
Walton v. Commonwealth
501 S.E.2d 134 (Va. 1998)
I. Facts
Percy Lavar Walton ("Walton") pled guilty to three counts of capital murder
during the commission of a felony and one count of capital murder for the killing
of more than one person within a three-year period.' The charges arose from the
murders of Elizabeth and Jessie Kendrick, ages eighty and eighty-one, between
the 19th and 26th of November 1996, and the murder of Archie Moore ("Moore")
shortly thereafter on November 29th or 30th in Danville, Virginia JudgeJames
F. Ingram of the Circuit Court, City of Danville, sentenced Walton to death
based on findings of both future dangerousness andvileness.3 Walton appealed
to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia set aside the trial court's finding of the
vileness factor for failure to articulate it in a written sentencing order but other-
wise upheld the convictions and death sentences, finding Walton's claims to be
waived or without merit."
III. Anaysis/Appcation in Virginia
A The Future Dangerousness Finding
Although Walton, age eighteen at the time of the crimes, had no significant
history of criminal activity, the court found that the trial court's finding of future
dangerousness could be supported by Walton's relatively minor record of as-
saults.' In upholding this finding, however, the court primarily relied on the
1. Walton v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 134, 135 (Va. 1998).
2. Walton, 501 S.E.2d at 136-37.
3. Id at 135.
4. Id at 138-41. The court determined that Walton's claim that the trial court erred in
finding the evidence stipulated to at trial sufficient to support a guilty plea was waived by the entry
of his guilty pleas. Id at 138. This claim evidently alleged the absence of a factual basis for the plea.
The court disposed of other claims in summary fashion, either by application of well-settled law,
or on a basis peculiar to the facts of the case. Because the court's discussion of these claims
provided little guidance, the following claims will not be discussed in this case note: the admissibility
of crime scene photographs, the sufficiency of evidence offered to support the finding of vileness,
and the proportionality review required under section 17-110.1(C)(2) ofthe Virginia Code. Walton,
501 S.E.2d at 138-41. Se also VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1(C)(2) (Michie 1997).
5. Walton, 501 S.E.2d at 139. Walton had previously been convicted of statutory burglary,
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circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense6 and statements
allegedly made to a jailhouse informant, Lacy Johnson.7
Although the court did not assert directly that the circumstances of a single
offense can alone constitute the necessary evidence to support a finding of future
dangerousness, it has done so in the past.8 Such a finding collapses a finding of
future dangerousness into one of vileness and should be resisted on due process
grounds. The United States Supreme Court permits death sentences to be based
on future dangerousness but has recognized the difficulty in applying this factor."
The Court has never held that circumstances surrounding the offense, standing
alone, could support such a finding.
The Walton opinion also does not reflect whether efforts were made to
attack the credibility of the jailhouse informant's testimony by use of subpoenas
duces tecum for jail records and demands for disclosures as required by Kyles v.
Wbitey' ° and Brady v. Maryland." These discovery tools should be utilized in every
instance where a jailhouse informer plays a role in the prosecution's case. The
informant in this case, LacyJohnson, was well known and had testified in other
cases with hope of reward.
grand theft, resisting arrest and assault and battery on a police officer. As a juvenile, Walton was
convicted of possession of a firearm and assault and battery. Id
6. Id The Kendricks returned home while Walton was in the process of robbing their
house. According to informant testimony, Mrs. Kendrick begged for her life prior to being shot.
The cause of death was a contact gunshot wound to the top of the head. Although it did not
contribute to her death, Mrs. Kendrick's shirt had been removed and fashioned into a noose and
tied around her neck. Walton first attempted unsuccessfully to kill Mr. Kendrick with a knife and
subsequently shot him in the top of the head at dose range. Id at 136, 139. Walton also relayed
information concerning the murder of Moore to the government informant. Walton first gained
access to Moore's apartment by asking to use the phone. Moore permitted him to do so. Later,
Walton returned and again requested to use the phone and Moore again invited him in. When
Moore went to hand him a portable telephone, Walton shot at him, missed, shot again and then
"dropp[ed] to the floor.., laughing." Walton, 501 S.E.2d at 139.
7. Johnson summarized the content of Walton's statements to him:
[A] fter he did the first killing, he knew what he wanted to do. And then he said that
he wanted to be famous, for killing a bunch of people, and that's why he wanted a high
powered enough gun, where he can kill everybody over in Cabin Lake, and he wanted
to catch everybody, like at the swimming pool one day, and just gun 'em all down...
[ie wanted to be famous... especially, in Danville, for killing a bunch of folks.
Id
8. See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1993). In Mumpby, the defendant
contested the trial court's finding of future dangerousness in absence of any prior criminal record.
The court upheld this finding, concluding that "the facts and circumstances surrounding the...
murder... [were] sufficient to support the trial court's finding of future dangerousness." Murpiy, 431
S.E.2d at 53.
9. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-903 (1983) (approving future dangerousness
as basis for death sentence but recognizing "difficulty" and power of American Psychological
Association in opposition).
10. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
11. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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B. Pkading Guily to CapitalMurder
In a case like Walton's, with multiple elderly victims, there is even more
reason not to allow a plea of guilty to be entered absent a formal or an extremely
strong informal assurance from the trial judge that the defendant will not be
sentenced to death. There is no reason not to go to trial in such a case, at the
very least to preserve the systemic issues in Virginia's death penalty scheme that
are as yet unresolved by the United States Supreme Court. A jury verdict could
not have been worse than Walton's current position.
Alix Marie Karl

